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Federally recognized Indian tribes are governments within our 
federal legal system.1  Tribes have aboriginal sovereignty that provides 
them with inherent governmental powers, such as the power to tax.2  
Tribal sovereignty also protects tribes from state interference, such as 
state taxation of tribal lands.3  Both the exercise of tribal governmen-
tal powers and the tribal immunity from state interference have a 
territorial component.  This makes the status of Indian lands a critical 
inquiry into tribal/state relations.4  Because of the importance of land 
 
 † Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota); 
Commissioner, Navajo Tax Commission, Navajo Nation (Arizona, New Mexico, 
Utah); Commissioner, Tesuque Tax Commission, Tesuque Pueblo (New Mexico); 
Associate Justice, Court of Appeals, Prairie Island Indian Community (Minnesota). 
 1. See John E. Thorson, Proceedings of the Symposium on the Settlement of Indian 
Water Rights Claims, 22 ENVTL. L. 1009, 1023 (1992). 
 2. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 
447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980) (finding that the tribal power to tax is a “fundamental 
attribute of sovereignty,” and that tribes have always had a “broad measure of civil 
jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands”). 
 3. See In re The New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1866) (involving New York’s 
attempt to tax tribal lands still occupied by tribal members). 
 4. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009) (involving Rhode Island’s 
assertion that lands placed in trust for the benefit of the Narragansett Indian Tribe 
were not trust lands because the Secretary of Interior lacked the authority to place the 
lands in trust; as a result, the housing project undertaken by the Tribe on these lands 
was subject to local land use regulations). 
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status in federal Indian law, especially in matters involving taxation, 
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Carcieri v. Salazar5 deserves 
special attention.  In the Carcieri case, the Court held that the 
Secretary of the Interior did not have the statutory authority to place 
lands into trust on behalf of Indian tribes that were recognized after 
the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.6 
Part I of this article discusses the Carcieri case.  I criticize the 
Court’s decision in part II, and explain how the Court reached its 
conclusion through sloppy statutory interpretation that ignored 
significant sections of text within the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934.  Part III explores the breadth of the Carcieri decision and 
demonstrates that its holding is far reaching.  With part IV, I consider 
the tribal, state, and federal tax consequences that occur when lands 
thought previously to be Indian trust lands take on a new status as 
non-trust lands that might be owned by the United States, by the 
individual tribe, or by a third party. 
I. SUMMARY OF CARCIERI V. SALAZAR 
Before the British colonization of New England, the Narragansett 
Indian Tribe occupied the greater part of what is now Rhode Island.7  
England and the Colony of Rhode Island dealt with the Narragansett 
Indian Tribe as an independent nation beginning in 1622.8  The 
devastation of King Phillip’s War in 1675 nearly destroyed the Tribe, 
which joined forces with the Niantic Tribe.9  The Colony of Rhode 
Island asserted guardianship over the Narragansett Indian Tribe in 
170910 and, almost two centuries later, terminated its relationship with 
the Tribe in 1880 when it enacted “detribalization” legislation.11  In 
1934, Rhode Island again recognized the Tribe.12  In the 1970s, the 
Tribe filed a land claim based on Rhode Island’s violation of the 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 1060–61. 
 7. See id. at 1061.  See also Narragansett Indian Tribe, Historical Perspective of 
the Narragansett Indian Tribe: Early History, http://www.narragansett-tribe.org/
history.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009). 
 8. Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett Indian 
Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177–78 (Feb. 10, 1983). 
 9. See Carcieri, 129 S. Ct. at 1061 n.1. 
 10. Id. at 1061. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett Indian 
Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. at 6177–78. 
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federal law that restricted state purchases of Indian lands.13  This 
lawsuit led to federal legislation settling the Tribe’s land claims case.14  
In 1983, the Tribe received federal recognition and became a 
federally recognized Indian tribe.15 
In 1991, the Tribe’s housing authority purchased thirty-one acres 
of land adjacent to the Tribe’s 1800 acre reservation created by the 
settlement legislation.16  The Tribe planned on constructing housing 
for tribal elders.17  The local township, however, sought an injunction 
to stop the construction of the project because it did not comply with 
the township’s land use regulations restricting development to one 
residential unit for every two acres of land.18  The tribal housing 
project contemplated fifty units on the thirty-one acres.19  The Tribe 
asserted that its newly acquired land was a dependent Indian commu-
nity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and, therefore, was 
exempt from the local regulations that would have imposed density 
restrictions.20  The federal First Circuit Court of Appeals held that this 
thirty-one-acre parcel of land was not a dependent Indian community 
because the federal government did not own the land.21 
At the beginning of the project, the Tribe had asked the Secre-
tary of the Interior to accept the thirty-one-acre parcel in trust under 
25 U.S.C. § 465.22  This provision, enacted by section 5 of the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, allowed the Secretary of the Interior to 
acquire lands on behalf of tribes as part of the process of partially 
restoring their land base.23  After the conclusion of the litigation on 
the question of whether the thirty-one-acre tract was a dependent 
Indian community, the Secretary of Interior accepted the Tribe’s 
request.24  The township and the Governor of Rhode Island contested 
this federal action.25  Before the U.S. Supreme Court, Rhode Island 
 
 13. See Carcieri, 129 S. Ct. at 1061–62. 
 14. See id. at 1062. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Narragansett Indian Tribe, Housing Department, http://www
.narragansett-tribe.org/housing-dept.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009). 
 18. Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir. 2007), abrogated by Carcieri 
v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009). 
 19. Carcieri, 497 F.3d at 24 n.4. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908, 921–22 (1st 
Cir. 1996). 
 22. Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1062 (2009). 
 23. See Carcieri, 129 S. Ct. at 1066. 
 24. See id. at 1062. 
 25. Id. at 1060–61. 
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argued that the Secretary of Interior did not have the statutory 
authority to take the land in trust because the authority to do so 
applied only to those tribes that were federally recognized before 
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934.26 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Cla-
rence Thomas, ruled that the legislation authorizing the Secretary of 
Interior to place lands in trust for tribes was limited to those tribes in 
existence on or before June 18, 1934.27  As a result, the Court 
concluded that the thirty-one-acre parcel was not “Indian Country” 
and was, therefore, subject to state regulation.28  The Court’s opinion 
is remarkably sloppy in its misreading of the federal statute.  The 
Court glosses over the meaning and the importance of the word 
“includes,” misreads the applicable text of the Indian Reorganization 
Act, and thereby restricts the authority of the Secretary of Interior to 
take land into trust. 
II. CRITICISM OF THE DECISION IN THE CARCIERI CASE 
My criticism of the Carcieri decision requires initial consideration 
of the legal context in which tribes find themselves.  Federally 
recognized Indian tribes are governments within the federal legal 
system.29  Their current sovereignty is actually their aboriginal 
sovereignty reduced by treaty, by federal legislation, or by necessary 
implication of their dependent status.30  Congress, given its power 
over Indian affairs, has the authority to affirm, confirm, or restore the 
sovereignty of Indian tribes.31  Most of the sovereignty that tribes have 
lost over the last thirty years, however, has resulted from decisions of 
the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Beginning with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,32 the Supreme 
 
 26. Id. at 1061. 
 27. Id.  June 18, 1934, was the date of enactment of the Indian Reorganization 
Act.  See Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, § 5, 48 Stat. 985 (1934) (current version 
at 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006)). 
 28. Carcieri, 129 S. Ct. at 1061. 
 29. See Thorson, supra note 1, at 1023. 
 30. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 
447 U.S. 134, 152–53 (1980) (discussing tribal sovereignty in relation to taxation, 
concluding that tribes have sovereignty “unless divested of it by federal law or 
necessary implication of their dependent status”). 
 31. See Lara v. United States, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (confirming the “plenary 
and exclusive” power of Congress over Indian affairs). 
 32. 435 U.S. 191, 206–08 (1978) (holding that a tribe had no criminal 
jurisdiction over a non-Indian who assaulted a tribal police officer on reservation 
lands). 
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Court handed down a series of decisions that have diminished tribal 
sovereignty without any apparent concern for its protection or its 
preservation as intended in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.33  
The case of Montana v. United States established that fee lands within 
reservations further limited tribal sovereignty, allowing a tribe to 
assert civil jurisdiction only if the tribe had a consensual relationship 
with a non-Indian or if tribal civil authority was necessary to preserve 
the tribe’s political integrity.34  In Duro v. Reina, the Court extended its 
holding in Oliphant and further restricted tribal criminal jurisdiction 
over non-member Indians.35  In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court 
treated a highway right-of-way the same as fee lands so that the 
restrictions in the Montana case applied and deprived a tribal court of 
civil jurisdiction over a lawsuit involving an automobile accident that 
took place within the tribe’s reservation.36  In Nevada v. Hicks, the 
Court restricted a tribal court’s civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian 
who entered the reservation and allegedly committed a tort against a 
tribal member.37  In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, the Court applied 
the Montana case to prohibit the Navajo Nation from imposing its 
hotel occupancy tax on a hotel that was located on fee land within the 
reservation when the hotel’s owner did not have an agreement with 
the Tribe consenting to the tribal tax.38 
The holdings in these cases, if extended to states, would yield 
ridiculous legal results.  Under the rationales of Oliphant and Duro, 
states would be unable to assert criminal jurisdiction over non-
residents.  State courts, applying the holdings of the Montana and A-1 
Contractors cases, would have no civil jurisdiction over transactions not 
occurring on lands owned by the state or even on federal highways 
constructed on state lands.  If the holding in Atkinson Trading Co. 
applied to states, they would be unable to impose their taxes on 
people living on private lands.  Imagine writing your state department 
of revenue and explaining that you want your state income taxes 
refunded to you because you live and work on private lands not 
 
 33. For background on the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, see Scott A. 
Taylor, The Unending Onslaught on Tribal Sovereignty: State Income Taxation of Non-
Member Indians, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 917, 948 (2008), which describes how Congress 
intended to undertake efforts to promote tribal sovereignty and to help tribes regain 
some of their lost lands. 
 34. See 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981). 
 35. See 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990). 
 36. See 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997). 
 37. See 533 U.S. 353, 359–69 (2001). 
 38. See 532 U.S. 645, 654–57 (2001). 
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owned by the state.  Next time you stay in a hotel, ask the hotel clerk 
to remove the local hotel occupancy tax from your bill because the 
hotel is located on private lands that the state does not own.  Under 
the reasoning of the Hicks case, states would have no civil jurisdiction 
over tort actions brought by state residents against non-residents, even 
if the tort was committed within the state on state lands. 
This backdrop of Supreme Court disregard for tribal sovereignty 
is reflected in the rather shoddy statutory analysis of the Court in its 
Carcieri decision.  The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 undertook 
to undo only a small part of over three centuries of dispossession of 
Native Americans, especially the destructive effects of forty years of 
allotment and assimilation.39  Congress concluded that the General 
Allotment Act had been a failure and that tribal sovereignty needed to 
be confirmed and restored.40  Part of the restoration process involved 
reacquisition of the tribal land base that had been lost through 
allotment and other forces.41  To accomplish this restoration policy, 
Congress gave the Secretary of the Interior the authority to acquire 
lands and to hold them in trust for the benefit of Indian tribes.42  In 
its Carcieri opinion, the Court construed the statute’s definition of 
“Indian” as excluding any members of tribes not recognized43 by the 
federal government on or before the date of enactment of the Indian 
Reorganization Act.44 
The land in trust provision is in section 5 of the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act and states: 
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion, 
to acquire, through purchase, relinquishment, gift, ex-
change, or assignment, any interest in lands, water rights, or 
surface rights to lands, within or without existing reserva-
tions, including trust or otherwise restricted allotments, 
whether the allottee be living or deceased, for the purpose 
of providing land for Indians . . . . 
 Title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this 
 
 39. See Taylor, supra note 33, at 948–49. 
 40. Id. at 948. 
 41. See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006) (codifying section 5 of the Indian Reorganization 
Act, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to reacquire Indian lands). 
 42. See id. 
 43. Actually, the Court and 15 U.S.C. § 479 use the phrase “now under Federal 
jurisdiction.”  I use the phrase “federally recognized Indian tribe” because the 
Department of Interior is now required to maintain a list of “federally recognized 
Indian tribes.”  See Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 479a–a-1 (2006). 
 44. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1064 (2009). 
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Act . . . shall be taken in the name of the United States in 
trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the 
land is acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt 
from State and local taxation.45 
The text of the definition section, on which the Court based its 
decision in Carcieri, is contained in section 19 of the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act and states: 
 The term “Indian” as used in this Act shall include all per-
sons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized 
Indian tribe now under Federal Jurisdiction . . . . The term 
“tribe” wherever used in this Act shall be construed to refer 
to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians 
residing on one reservation.46 
The key to the Court’s misreading of the statute is its overempha-
sis on the word “now.”  The Court first should have focused on the 
word “include” instead of “now.”  The word “include” is used perva-
sively in federal legislation to provide partial definitions of things that 
are specifically included, but without explicit limitation.  The very 
beginning of the United States Code is a good example.  In 1 U.S.C. § 
1, Congress uses the word “include” time after time to bring things 
within a general definition without limiting the defined term to those 
things following “include” or “shall include:” 
§ 1.  Words denoting number, gender, and so forth  
 In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless 
the context indicates otherwise— 
 words importing the singular include and apply to several 
persons, parties, or things; 
 words importing the plural include the singular; 
 words importing the masculine gender include the femi-
nine as well; 
 words used in the present tense include the future as well as 
the present; 
 the words “insane” and “insane person” and “lunatic” shall 
include every idiot, lunatic, insane person, and person non 
compos mentis; 
 the words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and 
joint stock companies, as well as individuals; 
 “officer” includes any person authorized by law to perform 
 
 45. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006). 
 46. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2006) (all emphases added). 
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the duties of the office; 
 “signature” or “subscription” includes a mark when the 
person making the same intended it as such; 
 “oath” includes affirmation, and “sworn” includes affirmed; 
 “writing” includes printing and typewriting and reproduc-
tions of visual symbols by photographing, multigraphing, 
mimeographing, manifolding, or otherwise.47 
The above definitions all operate in a way that adds items to the 
general definition.  If Congress intends to limit a term to a precise 
and limited category of things or items, it uses the word “means.”48 
Elsewhere in Title 25 of the United States Code, which contains 
the codification of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, we find 
additional examples of Congress using “includes” or “shall include” in 
an illustrative, as opposed to a delimiting, sense.  In 25 U.S.C. § 443a, 
for example, a provision allowing transfers by the federal government 
of property to tribes defines “Indian” this way: “the term ‘Indian’ shall 
include Eskimos and Aleuts.”49  Obviously, the statute allowing transfers 
of property to tribes also extends to tribes whose members are 
Indians, other than Eskimos or Aleuts.  This example illustrates how a 
careless reading of this illustrative definition using “shall include” 
would lead to the erroneous conclusion that Congress intended to 
exclude tribes in the lower forty-eight states.  It is apparent that 
Congress intended to include tribes from Alaska, along with those 
from the lower forty-eight states, and used an inclusive definition to 
accomplish its goal.50 
One of the Court’s mistakes in Carcieri was to read “shall include” 
as “shall mean.”51  In so doing, the Court unjustifiably limited the 
scope of the land-to-trust provision contained in the Indian Reorgani-
 
 47. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (all emphases added). 
 48. See Burgess v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1572, 1578 n.3 (2008) (explaining that 
“includes” is a word of enlargement and not limitation whereas “means” imports an 
exclusive definition); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 n.10 (1979) (stating that 
a definition that uses the word “means” excludes any other meaning that is not 
stated); Groman v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 82, 86 (1937) (defining “means” as exclusive 
and “includes” as enlarging a term having a common meaning).  See also 26 U.S.C. § 
7701(c) (2006) (“The terms ‘includes’ and ‘including’ when used in a definition 
contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within 
the meaning of the term defined.”). 
 49. 25 U.S.C. § 443a (2006) (emphasis added). 
 50. See Inter-Tribal Council of Nev. v. Hodel, 856 F.2d 1344, 1351 (9th Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989) (ruling on a question of standing, the court 
acknowledged that a Nevada tribe could be eligible for a grant under 25 U.S.C. § 
433a). 
 51. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1066 (2009). 
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zation Act.  The Court justified its reading of “shall include” to mean 
“shall mean” because the list of three categories of Indians was 
comprehensive.52  The Court’s logic, however, is flawed because 
members of tribes to be recognized in the future would be “Indians” 
under the generally accepted definition.  Accordingly, the definition 
easily could be read as insuring inclusion of members of tribes 
recognized before enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act 
without excluding members of tribes that may be recognized in the 
future.  This is entirely consistent with the statutory use of an 
inclusive, not delimiting, definition of the term “Indian.” 
Instead of first focusing on “include,” the Court concentrated on 
the meaning of the word “now.”53  The Court basically ignored the 
legislative history dealing with the insertion of the word “now” in 
section 19 of the Indian Reorganization Act.  The legislative history 
clearly shows that the word “now” was added to section 19 as some-
thing of a political compromise over issues totally unrelated to the 
land-to-trust provisions.54  The Court did not pay even minimal 
attention to this legislative history.  Had it done so, the Court would 
have had to find that the word “now” lacked the definitional clarity 
that the Court supposed.55  This lack of clarity makes the term “now” 
ambiguous in the context of section 19.  Had the Court recognized 
this obvious ambiguity, it would have been required to give deference 
to the interpretation of the Department of Interior, which had 
consistently construed section 19 as not limiting the Secretary’s 
authority under section 5.56 
Finally, as an explicit rule of statutory construction, Congress 
provides that “words used in the present tense include the future as 
well as the present.”57  The Court might respond by asserting that only 
verbs have a tense.  However, the text of the statute says “words” not 
“verbs.”  And as the Court explained, “now” as an adjective or as an 
adverb imports a meaning “[a]t the present time.”58  Accordingly, 
 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15, 26–30 (1st Cir. 2007) (reviewing the 
confusing circumstances that led to the addition of the word “now”), rev’d sub nom. 
Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009). 
 55. See Carcieri, 129 S. Ct. at 1076 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 56. See id. at 1073–74. 
 57. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (noting also that the definitions used for statutory 
construction do not apply if the context indicates that use of the definitional rules 
would be inappropriate) (emphasis added). 
 58. See Carcieri, 128 S. Ct. at 1064 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 1671 (2d ed. 1934) (alteration in original)). 
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“now” indicates the present tense and 1 U.S.C. § 1 defines the present 
tense as including the future as well as the present.  Applying this 
Congress-made rule of statutory construction, the conclusion is 
obvious—“now” includes the future unless the context indicates 
otherwise.  The Court did not persuasively show that the context of 
section 19 required a narrow reading of the word “now.”  In fact, 
section 7 of the Indian Reorganization Act authorized the Secretary of 
the Interior to establish new reservations.59  These new reservations 
undoubtedly would include tribes that had not been recognized 
before enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act.  Section 7 
provides a context from which we can safely and easily infer that 
“now” as used in section 19 includes members of tribes to be recog-
nized in the future. 
The Court’s final, biggest, and most obvious mistake in its inter-
pretation of section § 19, was to ignore the definition of the word 
“tribe” contained in the same text that defines “Indian.”60  In section 
19, Congress defines “tribe” as “any Indian tribe, organized band, 
pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation.”61  The temporal 
limitation of “now” is not in the text of the definition of “tribe.”62  The 
absence of “now” in the definition of “tribe” makes perfect sense 
because section 7 of the Indian Reorganization Act authorizes the 
Secretary of the Interior to establish new reservations.63  These new 
reservations presumably would involve recognition of tribes after the 
date of enactment of the statute in 1934.64  Accordingly, the definition 
of “tribe” obviously referred to those tribes already recognized as of 
the date of enactment of the statute together with newly recognized 
tribes that would have new reservations after the date of enactment.  
The Court’s use of the definition of the word “tribe” instead of 
“Indian” would have been a rational approach because the land-in-
trust action undertaken by the Secretary of the Interior was for the 
benefit of the Narragansett Indian Tribe and not for individual 
owners.  The beneficiary of the trust relationship was the tribe.  
Accordingly, the Court should have looked to the definition of the 
word “tribe,” the definition of which was not limited by the word 
“now.”65  One could argue that this is an instance of the Court being 
 
 59. 25 U.S.C. § 467 (2006). 
 60. See 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2006). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. § 467. 
 64. See id. § 461. 
 65. See id. § 479. 
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so ad hoc that it lost its ability to undertake fairly straight-forward legal 
reasoning. 
Looking now at the specific facts in the Carcieri case, we see that 
the Department of Interior placed the specific land in trust for the 
Narragansett Indian Tribe,66 not for individual members of the Tribe.  
The land-in-trust provision specifically allows lands to be placed in 
trust for tribes or for individuals.67  To achieve its desired result, the 
Court basically applied the wrong rule.  Had the Court applied the 
correct rule for tribes, the result would have been abundantly clear.  
Under the language of the statute, the Department of Interior clearly 
had and still has the authority to place land into trust for any Indian 
tribe without regard to the date of the tribe’s federal recognition. 
III. BREADTH OF APPLICATION 
The possible breadth of the application of the Supreme Court 
ruling in Carcieri v. Salazar is uncertain and unsettling.  Under the 
holding of the case, all land-into-trust transfers for the benefit of 
tribes not recognized on or before the date of enactment of the 
Indian Reorganization Act are deemed to be invalid.68  The invalidity 
of these transfers means that these “Carcieri” lands are not subject to 
tribal authority but instead are subject to state authority.  For 
purposes of this article, the potential tax implications are striking. 
As of the date of this article, there are 564 federally recognized 
Indian tribes.69  On the date of the enactment of the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act, the United States recognized 292 tribes.70  During the 
1950s and 60s, the United States terminated federal recognition of 
many tribes.71  Thirty-seven of these tribes have reestablished them-
selves through federal recognition.72  With the admission of Alaska to 
the Union in 1959, more than 200 tribes were added to the list of 
 
 66. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1063 (2009). 
 67. See 25 U.S.C. § 465. 
 68. See Carcieri, 129 S. Ct. at 1068. 
 69. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, REF. NO. 2007-10-
007, A STATISTICAL PORTRAYAL OF FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS’ 
TAX FILING CHARACTERISTICS FOR TAX YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2004 1 (2007) (noting 564 
federally recognized Indian Tribes), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/
auditreports/2007reports/200710007fr.pdf. 
 70. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-49, INDIAN ISSUES: IMPROVEMENT 
NEEDED IN TRIBAL RECOGNITION PROCESS 21 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d0249.pdf (discussing federal recognition of Indian tribes). 
 71. See id. at 23. 
 72. See id. 
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federally recognized Indian tribes.73  Since 1934, Congress has 
recognized sixteen tribes and the Department of Interior has 
recognized thirty-one.74  For all tribes not recognized on the date of 
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934 or that were 
terminated and then reestablished, special care must be taken to 
identify those lands that the Secretary of Interior may have placed in 
trust under the authority of section 5 of the Indian Reorganization 
Act.75  After Carcieri any and all of these lands previously viewed as 
under tribal authority are arguably under the authority of the state in 
which they are located. 
The tax implications are mind-boggling.  Section 5, for example, 
provides an explicit exemption from state and local taxation.76  If 
section 5, because of the decision in Carcieri, does not apply, then 
these lands may be subject to state property taxation.77  Because the 
initial transfer in trust was invalid, the lands may have been subjected 
to state and local property taxation from the time of initial tribal 
ownership.  Property tax liabilities may be limited by the applicable 
statute of limitations, but under the best of circumstances, this limits 
liability for the last three to six years.78  Property taxes are not the only 
taxes that come into question.79 
IV. TAXATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY AFTER CARCIERI 
“[T]he power to tax [is] the power to destroy.”80  For many gov-
ernments, tax revenue is the lifeblood of the state.81  Without the 
power to tax, many political entities could not exist.  In our federal 
system, the three sovereigns—tribes, states, and the federal govern-
ment—compete for the same tax base.82  The power to tax, as a 
 
 73. See id. at 23–24. 
 74. See id. at 24. 
 75. See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006). 
 76. See id. 
 77. See infra notes 134–57 and accompanying text. 
 78. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-5-23 (2009) (providing the assessor of property 
taxes with the power to assess back taxes for up to six years if the lands have previously 
escaped assessment of the local property tax). 
 79. See infra notes 158–68 and accompanying text. 
 80. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819). 
 81. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GOVS/09-2, QUARTERLY SUMMARY OF STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2009pubs/qtaxbr-q092.pdf (showing the major sources of and growth in tax 
revenues for state and local governments within the United States). 
 82. See, e.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 99–100 
(2005) (holding that gasoline was subject to federal, state, and tribal fuel excise taxes 
12
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matter of fairness and pragmatism, has limits based on political 
boundaries83 and on the political relationships of taxpayers.84  
Transactions taking place wholly outside of political boundaries are 
not subject to taxation by a government unless the taxpayer has a 
political relationship with the particular government.85 
For example, Canada cannot impose its income tax on me if I am 
not present in Canada, earn no income there, have no economic 
connections with Canada, and am not a Canadian citizen.  As it turns 
out, none of these conditions applies to me, and, as a result, I pay no 
income tax to Canada.  However, if I lived in Canada, earned income 
there, or owned income-producing property there, then any of these 
conditions would enable Canada to assert its taxing power over me 
and my income.86  An important ingredient in Canada’s potential 
power to tax me is Canada’s territory—its political boundaries.  These 
boundaries determine when I am in or not in Canada and also 
whether I own property there. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court has said, the “where” question is often 
critical when deciding whether a state or tribal tax is valid.87  After 
Carcieri, many tens of thousands of acres of land are not so clearly 
Indian Country anymore.  This means that state taxation is less 
restricted and that tribal taxation is barred on these “Carcieri” lands. 
In the context of taxation in Indian Country, things get even 
more complicated because we have at least three potential govern-
ments trying to tax the same person, thing, or activity.88  As between 
the federal and the state power to tax, some constitutional limitations 
apply, but basically both governments are largely free to tax the same 
thing.89  For example, a state90 and a federal fuel excise tax91 applies to 
 
when sold at a tribal gas station owned by the Tribe and located on tribal lands). 
 83. Generally, this requires some nexus, connection, or minimum contacts with 
the taxing jurisdiction sufficient to justify taxation.  See John A. Swain, State Income 
Taxation: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 345 (2003) 
(discussing the constitutional nexus standard for state income tax and evaluating 
whether this standard reflects good tax policy). 
 84. See, e.g., Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924) (subjecting a person to the U.S. 
federal income tax solely on the basis of citizenship even though the taxpayer had no 
physical or economic presence in the United States). 
 85. See id. 
 86. See Canada Revenue Agency, Non-Residents of Canada, http://www.cra-arc
.gc.ca/tx/nnrsdnts/ndvdls/nnrs-eng.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009) (explaining 
circumstances when non-residents are subject to Canada’s income tax). 
 87. See, e.g., Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 101–02. 
 88. See Taylor, supra note 33, at 918–20. 
 89. See, e.g., Scott A. Taylor, The Importance of Being Interest: Why a State Cannot 
Impose Its Income Tax on Tribal Bonds, 9 (2009), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/
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the sale of gasoline.  The same is true for tobacco products,92 alco-
hol,93 and income.94  The federal government, however, does not have 
a property tax or a retail sales tax.95  Most states, by comparison, do 
have property taxes and sales taxes.96  As between and among states, 
rules have developed that eliminate multiple taxation.97  As a result, 
just a single state income, property, or sales tax tends to apply. 
As between tribes and states, less harmony prevails.  States rou-
tinely assert their power to tax tribes and transactions taking place 
within Indian Country even when federal law often bars such 
taxation.98  As a result, the same transaction may be subject to both a 
state and a tribal tax.  When this happens, multiple tribal/state 
taxation of the same income or activity hurts on-reservation activity.  
For example, if both state X and tribe Y impose a $0.20 per gallon tax 
on gasoline, then on-reservation gasoline will cost more because each 
gallon bears a $0.40 tax whereas the gasoline sold off the reservation 
is subject to just a $0.20 per gallon tax.99 
A. The Tribal Power to Tax 
A federally recognized Indian tribe has the power to tax.100  This 
power is an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty.101  This tribal 
taxing power clearly extends to tribal lands located within a tribe’s 
reservation boundaries and also extends off the reservation when the 
 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=scott_taylor (discussing commerce clause 
limitations on state taxation). 
 90. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-13-1 to -18 (2009). 
 91. See I.R.C. § 4081(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2009). 
 92. See I.R.C. § 5701 (2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-12-1–7-12-19 (2009). 
 93. See I.R.C. § 5001 (2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-17-1–7-17-12 (2009). 
 94. See I.R.C. § 1 (2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-2-1–7-2-36 (2009). 
 95. See I.R.C. §§ 1–9834 (2009). 
 96. See CENSUS REPORT, supra note 81. 
 97. See Multistate Tax Compact, http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/
Multistate_Tax_Commission/About_MTC/MTC_Compact/COMPACT(1).pdf (last 
visited Dec. 10, 2009). 
 98. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995) 
(describing Oklahoma’s unsuccessful attempt to impose its fuel excise tax on the 
Tribe’s gas station operated on the reservation). 
 99. See, e.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) 
(involving a case where gasoline was subject to state and tribal fuel excise taxes when 
sold at a tribal gas owned by the tribe and located on tribal lands). 
 100. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 
U.S. 134, 152–53 (1980) (finding that the tribal power to tax is a “fundamental 
attribute of sovereignty” and that tribes have always had a “broad measure of civil 
jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands”). 
 101. See id. 
14
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lands are held in trust by the United States.102  Before the Carcieri case, 
lands that passed into trust were viewed as tribal lands.  Consequently, 
the tribal power to tax extended to such lands.  After Carcieri, the 
transfers into trust are viewed as invalid if the specific tribe was 
recognized after the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act.  
These lands no longer have the status as tribal lands.  Therefore, the 
tribal power to tax does not extend to them. 
So for example, if a tribe has trust lands subject to the Carcieri 
opinion and if the tribe also has one or more tribal taxes, then the 
tribal tax on property or transactions located on these lands is 
arguably invalid.  The initial question is whether the “Carcieri” lands 
are within or outside the tribe’s reservation boundaries.  The lands in 
the Carcieri case were located just outside the reservation boundary of 
the Narragansett Indian Tribe, but could have been located within the 
reservation because the land-to-trust provision in the Indian Reorgan-
ization Act applies to lands whether on or off existing reservations.103  
If these lands are on the reservation, then the ownership of the lands 
is a critical question because the legal standard permitting tribal 
taxation hinges on ownership.  On-reservation lands owned by a non-
Indian and not subject to restriction are known as “fee lands” over 
which the tribe has a limited power to tax.  If the lands are located 
outside the reservation and are not held in trust by the United States 
for the benefit of the tribe, then the tribe has no power to tax 
activities associated with those lands.104 
In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,105 the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the Navajo Nation did not have the power to impose its hotel 
occupancy tax on tourists who visited a hotel built on fee land located 
within the Navajo Reservation.106  In the Atkinson case, the land was fee 
land because the reservation boundary of the Navajo Nation was 
extended in 1934.107  Following the reservation extension, owners of 
lands within the extension had the option of keeping their lands as 
“fee” lands or exchanging them for other federal lands located 
 
 102. See Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
520 U.S. 1139 (1997). 
 103. See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2009), codifying section 5 of the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 5, 48 Stat. 984, 985. 
 104. See, e.g., Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531 
(10th Cir. 1995) (involving a case in which the taxpayer’s core theory was that the 
lands in question were outside the boundary of the Navajo Nation and, therefore, not 
Indian Country within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1151). 
 105. 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
 106. Id. at 659. 
 107. Id. at 648. 
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outside the new boundary of the Navajo Nation.108  The original 
owner of the land was a non-Indian who operated a trading post and 
found that the extension of the reservation did not adversely affect 
the operation of his trading post.109  He later sold the land to another 
non-Indian.110  The new owner of the fee land built a hotel there.111  
The Navajo Nation imposed a hotel occupancy tax on all tourists 
staying in hotels located within the Navajo Nation.112 
The hotel owner in the Atkinson case asserted that the hotel was 
located on fee land, and that the Navajo Nation’s power to tax did not 
extend to fee land unless the hotel owner had a consensual relation-
ship with the Navajo Nation.113  The requirement of a consensual 
relationship comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in Montana v. 
United States.114  In the Montana case, the Court stated: 
 Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise 
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their 
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.  A tribe may re-
gulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the ac-
tivities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships 
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, 
contracts, leases, or other arrangements.115 
In the Atkinson case, the Court ruled that the Navajo Nation 
could not impose its hotel occupancy tax unless the taxpayer entered 
into a consensual relationship with the Tribe.116  The facts of the case 
showed that the taxpayer, Atkinson Trading Company, was a licensed 
Indian trader.117  The Court, however, found that the licensed activity 
did not extend to the operation of the hotel.118  The Atkinson case, 
then, suggests that tribes cannot impose tribal taxes on non-Indians 
within the reservation when the activity takes place on fee lands unless 
the activity is subject to some agreement between the taxpayer and the 
tribe.119 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 649. 
 114. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 115. Id. at 565. 
 116. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 656–57. 
 117. Id. at 656. 
 118. Id. 
 119. The Montana case is viewed as having two prongs regarding tribal authority 
over fee lands.  The first prong involved tribal authority when the non-member and 
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On-reservation lands that are “Carcieri” lands, however, require a 
different analytical approach.  Initially, it is important to note that 
most tribes recognized after 1934 are not likely to have much or any 
fee lands located within their reservations’ boundaries because their 
reservations were probably established after the end of the allotment 
period.  In rare cases where a tribe has “Carcieri” lands within its 
reservation, the underlying owner is most likely going to be the tribe.  
In such cases, the land is fee land that the tribe owns and cannot be 
placed in trust because of the decision in the Carcieri case.  The 
Supreme Court has not yet answered the question of a tribe’s power 
to tax activity on such fee lands when the owner of the lands is the 
tribe.  If we go back and look at the Atkinson case, and assume that the 
Navajo Nation bought the land and the hotel that Atkinson Trading 
Company owned, then the result is not so obvious if the land is not 
placed in trust under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act.  In 
the Montana case, the Court made much of the fact that the land in 
question was not tribal land, implying that tribal ownership should 
make a difference.120  Almost all tribal lands within reservations are 
held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the particular 
tribe.  Fee lands owned by a tribe within its reservation are different 
from trust lands because the fee lands may be alienable without the 
consent of the United States.121  Consequently, a taxpayer could argue 
that tribally owned fee land should be subject to the Montana 
limitations.  Tribes, however, easily could argue that tribally-owned fee 
lands within their reservation are essentially the equivalent of trust 
lands. 
On the other hand, when a tribe owns land located outside of a 
 
the tribe had entered into a consensual relationship.  The second prong provided 
that a “tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the 
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct 
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or 
the health or welfare of the tribe.”  Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.  The Court in the 
Atkinson case found that the taxpayer’s operation of a hotel did not threaten the 
political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare of the Navajo Nation.  
Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 657–58. 
 120. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66. 
 121. See Cass County, Minn. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 
103, 113–14 (1998) (suggesting that fee lands acquired by a tribe and located on the 
reservation remain freely alienable if the lands had at one time been made freely 
alienable by Congress).  But see 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2009), which provides that no 
“purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, 
from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, 
unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the 
Constitution;” § 177 suggests that all lands owned by tribes have limited alienability. 
17
Taylor: Taxation in Indian Country after Carcieri v. Salazar
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
7. Taylor.docx 1/18/2010  9:39 PM 
2010] TAXATION AFTER CARCIERI V. SALAZAR 607 
tribe’s reservation, such land and the activities taking place on it are 
not subject to tribal taxation unless the lands are held in trust by the 
United States.122  The Carcieri case makes an important difference here 
because it cuts off a tribe’s tax base.  For those tribes with a very small 
land base, like the Narragansett Indian Tribe, economic development 
may be quite limited.  If tribes can extend their land base, then 
economic development may lead to a productive tax base.  With a 
productive tax base, a tribe can generate revenue to fund tribal 
programs that promote education, health, and general welfare.  The 
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones123 case contains a factual situation that 
illustrates the negative implications of the Carcieri case.  In Mescalero 
the tribe developed a ski resort that was a success.  The resort and ski 
lifts were on federal lands located just outside the reservation.124  As a 
result, the tribe did not have the authority to impose its own taxes on 
these activities.  The state of New Mexico, however, did have the 
power to tax these activities even though undertaken by the tribe.  
Had these activities taken place within the reservation, the tribe would 
have been immune from the state taxes and would have been able to 
impose its own tax.125 
In summary, the Carcieri case has the possible effect of precluding 
tribes from imposing tribal taxes within their reservations on transac-
tions taking place on lands placed into trust if the particular tribe had 
not been recognized on or before the date of enactment of the Indian 
Reorganization Act in 1934.  If the lands are located outside the 
reservation boundary, then the tribal power to tax almost certainly 
does not apply. 
In instances where tribes have such lands and also have been im-
posing tribal taxes on transactions involving those lands, the taxpayers 
will very likely contest the taxes going forward and sue for refunds for 
taxes paid in the past.  Tribes with tax systems impose limitations on 
claims for refunds so that taxpayers cannot file claims for refunds 
after a certain amount of time has passed from the time the return 
was filed or the tax was paid.  In any case, tribes face the challenge of 
losing future tax revenue and the cost of paying claims for refunds.  
Tribes will be well advised to contest those refunds that are from 
periods where the statute of limitations has expired.  In addition, 
 
 122. See Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 
520 U.S. 1139 (1997). 
 123. 411 U.S. 145 (1973). 
 124. Id. at 146. 
 125. Id. at 148. 
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tribes should consider the possibility of asserting the power to tax 
when the lands are within the reservation and owned in fee by the 
tribe.  As I explained, the Supreme Court has not yet answered this 
question.  The merits are on the side of the tribes because tribal 
ownership of the lands, even if not held in trust by the United States, 
represents an assertion of tribal sovereignty over territory.  If the tribe 
owns the lands, it certainly retains the inherent authority to exercise 
political dominion, including the power to tax. 
B. State Taxation 
State taxation of federally recognized Indian tribes, their lands, 
property, and activities has been a source of friction between tribes 
and states for a very long time.126  This friction continues.127  Likewise, 
state attempts to tax tribal members began in the nineteenth cen-
tury128 and continue into the twenty-first century, at least in cases 
involving Native Americans who live and work on reservations but are 
members of another tribe.129  The Carcieri case produces problems 
because tribes finding themselves with lands that they thought were 
held in trust and, therefore, immune from state and local taxation, 
may now find that state and local tax officials are eager to assert and 
collect current and back taxes.  The power of a state to tax tribes and 
their members depends in large part on the definition of Indian 
Country.  For purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction, Congress 
defines Indian Country in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as: 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under 
the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwith-
standing the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-
way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent In-
dian communities within the borders of the United States 
whether within the original or subsequently acquired terri-
tory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a 
 
 126. See, e.g., In re N.Y. Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1866) (involving New York’s attempt 
to tax tribal lands still occupied by tribal members). 
 127. See, e.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) 
(dealing with attempts by the state of Kansas to impose motor fuel taxes on gasoline 
sold at a station owned by the tribe on its own reservation). 
 128. See, e.g., In re Kan. Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866) (holding that a 
county in Kansas could not tax the lands of individual tribal members granted by the 
United States under the terms of a treaty). 
 129. See, e.g., LaRock v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907 (Wis. 2001) 
(holding that Wisconsin’s income tax applied to the income of a Native American 
who lived and worked on the reservation of a tribe of which she was not a member); 
Taylor, supra note 33. 
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state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which 
have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running 
through the same.130 
The U.S. Supreme Court, for purposes of limiting a state’s power 
to tax, has adopted the Indian Country definition contained in 18 
U.S.C. § 1151.131  Although not explicitly confirmed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. 
Roberts,132 held that land transferred into trust and not located within a 
formal reservation would be Indian Country, either as an informal 
reservation or as a dependent Indian community.133  The Roberts 
decision indicates that land placed in trust, even if located outside a 
tribe’s formal or informal reservation, is treated as Indian Country for 
purposes of the federal common law rules that govern limitations of 
state taxation.134  In general, a state’s power to tax is much more 
limited when it reaches into Indian Country.135  Conversely, this state 
power to tax, when exercised outside of Indian Country, is quite 
limited.  In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that the state 
power to tax tribes outside of Indian Country is permitted unless 
expressly prohibited by federal legislation.136  After Carcieri, many 
transfers into trust under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization are 
not trust lands, and therefore, not Indian Country.137  As a result, the 
federal Indian law exemption from state taxation does not extend to 
these lands. 
In addition, section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act contains 
its own explicit tax exemption.  The language in section 5 provides 
that any lands taken in trust by the United States under the Indian 
 
 130. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2009). 
 131. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993) (using the 
definition of Indian Country found in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 to limit Oklahoma’s power to 
tax the income of tribal members). 
 132. 185 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000). 
 133. Id. at 1133. 
 134. Id. at 1131. 
 135. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 136. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 465 (1995) 
(allowing state income taxation of tribal members residing outside of Indian Country 
unless a federal law or treaty otherwise prohibits such taxation); Mescalero Apache 
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (allowing imposition of the New Mexico 
gross receipts tax on commercial activities of a tribally-owned ski resort conducted 
adjacent to, but outside, the reservation unless there is “express federal law to the 
contrary”). 
 137. See Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 985 (1934) (current version 
at 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006); Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1061(2009). 
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Reorganization Act “shall be exempt from State and local taxation.”138  
This specific exemption no longer applies to those lands governed by 
the Carcieri case.  We should not forget that in Carcieri, the State of 
Rhode Island (and its political subdivisions) asserted regulatory 
control over the housing development that the Narragansett Indian 
Tribe undertook to build on the thirty-one acre tract that it had 
purchased from a private landowner.139  The holding in the Carcieri 
case means that the Secretary of Interior did not have the authority to 
take the thirty-one acre parcel into trust for the benefit of the Tribe.140  
Because the transfer in trust is invalid, the Tribe remains the fee 
owner of land located outside its reservation.141  The tax exemption 
language in section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act does not apply 
to any of those lands placed in trust for tribes recognized after the 
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934.142  As a result, the 
non-trust status of the thirty-one acre tract exposes these “Carcieri” 
lands to state and local property taxes. 
The leading case on state taxation of tribal activities taking place 
outside tribal boundaries is Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones.143  The 
Mescalero case involved a tribal enterprise located off of, but adjacent 
to, the Tribe’s reservation.144  The Tribe had the right to use the off-
reservation lands under a thirty-year lease it entered into with the U.S. 
Forest Service.145  With the help of a federal loan, the Tribe built and 
operated a ski resort on these lands.146  For the privilege of doing 
business in New Mexico, the state imposed its gross receipts tax on the 
Tribe’s sales of goods and services made in connection with the 
operation of the ski resort.147  The U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
tribe going beyond its reservation boundaries (or outside of its Indian 
Country) is subject to state regulatory authority—including a state’s 
power to tax.148  In Mescalero, the state’s gross receipts tax was upheld 
precisely because the lands on which the activity took place were 
 
 138. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2009) (codifying section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act 
of 1934, ch. 576, § 5, 48 Stat. 984, 985). 
 139. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1059 (2009). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. 411 U.S. 145 (1973). 
 144. Id. at 146. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 147. 
 148. Id. at 157–58. 
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located outside of the Tribe’s political boundaries.149 
By combining Mescalero with Carcieri, we may infer that a state can 
tax a tribal enterprise located outside of a tribe’s reservation and not 
located on trust land set apart under section 5 of the Indian Reorgan-
ization Act.  In the Mescalero case, New Mexico did not attempt to 
impose its property tax on the underlying lands owned by the United 
States because they were national forest lands.  One may presume that 
New Mexico understood that lands owned by the federal government 
are immune from state property taxation.150  However, New Mexico 
did attempt to impose its compensating use tax on the ski lift towers 
that were erected on the ski run.151  The New Mexico compensating 
use tax is imposed on purchasers who acquire property from out-of-
state sources.152  The Court in the Mescalero case erroneously assumed 
that the federal lease of lands to the Tribe to construct the ski resort 
was covered by section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act.153  The 
Court then extended the property tax exemption in section 5 to the 
ski towers because they were affixed to the land and became part of 
the real property.154  The Court reasoned that a state tax on the ski 
towers was effectively a tax on the land and, therefore, barred by 
section 5.155 
After the Carcieri case, states undoubtedly will attempt to impose 
their property taxes on lands placed in trust for tribes that were not 
recognized on or after enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act.  
The state of the title might possibly cloud the question of whether 
state and local property taxes can apply.  For example, if the United 
States continues to hold the property in trust for the benefit of the 
tribe, then the United States is the owner of that land.  Conceivably, 
this could happen because the tribe transferred lands it owned to the 
Department of Interior with the expectation that these lands would be 
placed in trust under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act.  The 
 
 149. Id. at 148–49. 
 150. States, however, receive federal payments to compensate them for the tax-
exempt status of federal lands.  See 31 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6907 (2009) (codifying federal 
legislation enacting a program to compensate states for lost property taxes that result 
from the tax-exempt status of federal lands). 
 151. 411 U.S. at 158–59. 
 152. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-7 (2009). 
 153. See 411 U.S. at 146.  A close reading of the Court’s opinion shows that the 
lands on which the ski resort was located were federal lands leased by the United 
States to the Tribe.  If the lands had been a transfer in trust, then there would have 
been no term limitation. 
 154. Id. at 158. 
 155. Id. 
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United States, however, by virtue of the Carcieri case, lacks the power 
to place the lands in trust under section 5 and to make them tax-
exempt under the statute.  Unless the United States conveys the lands 
back to the tribe, the United States continues to be the owner of the 
lands.  Lands owned by the United States are exempt from state and 
local property taxes.156  No federal statute appears to waive the federal 
immunity from state and local property taxation in circumstances 
similar or identical to the facts in Carcieri.157  In circumstances where 
the United States continues as the landowner, general federal 
immunity from state and local property taxation should apply.  If a 
tribe gets a property tax bill, the tribe should just send it to the United 
States.  The United States, then, as landowner, can assert its immunity.  
States and local governments that find that their taxing authority is 
barred by federal immunity for “Carcieri” lands still held by the United 
States cannot claim federal payments for “entitlement lands” under 
the federal legislation meant to compensate local governments for 
their loss of property tax revenue.158 
However, a tribe or third party may be viewed as the owner of 
these “Carcieri” lands if the courts view the underlying conveyance as 
void or voidable under the theory that the parties understood that the 
United States had the power to place these lands in trust under the 
authority granted in section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act.  
Clarity could be achieved if the United States conveyed the specific 
“Carcieri” lands to each respective tribe or to the party that initially 
had transferred the lands to the United States for the purpose of 
placing them in trust.  The Bureau of Indian Affairs (an agency within 
the Department of Interior), however, has undertaken no efforts to 
dispose of “Carcieri” lands but instead has begun a consultation 
process to determine the best course of action.159  The actions being 
 
 156. See Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 258 (1985) 
(noting the “tax-immune status of federal lands” located within states).  Presumably, 
the immunity of federal lands from state and local property taxes derives from 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (holding that states could not tax federal 
instrumentalities). 
 157. See United States v. Lewis County, 175 F.3d 671, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1018 
(1999) (dealing with a narrow federal statute authorizing state and local property 
taxation of lands owned by the federal Farm Service Agency).  This author could find 
no federal statute allowing state taxation of lands owned by the federal government 
received from a tribe but not held in trust. 
 158. See 31 U.S.C. § 6901(1) (2009) (defining “entitlement lands” but not 
including lands held by the United States for the benefit of Indian tribes). 
 159. See PowerPoint Presentation of Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Solicitor, and 
Hilary Tompkins, Solicitor, Department of Interior, http://www.bia.gov/idc/groups/
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taken do not contemplate the return of “Carcieri” lands to tribes or to 
the original transferor.160 
The primary difficulty here is determining which property law 
governs the transfer for purposes of determining the ownership 
interest of the land.  Federal or state law may apply to determine the 
true owner of the “Carcieri” lands.  Arguably, federal law should apply 
to govern the question of the title because both the United States and 
a particular Indian tribe have an interest in the “Carcieri” lands.  In 
fact, any action to quiet title brought by a party other than the United 
States or the interested tribe may very well be barred on the theory 
that the United States has an interest in these lands.  Congress has 
waived the sovereign immunity of the United States in quiet-title 
actions, but not when a tribe has a potential interest in the lands.161  
For this purpose, the applicable statute refers to “trust or restricted 
Indian lands.”162  After the Carcieri case, viewing these lands as held in 
“trust” would be inappropriate given the Court’s reading of the 
Indian Reorganization Act as not extending land-to-trust authority to 
the Secretary of the Interior for tribes recognized after the Act was 
passed in 1934.163  Accordingly, the question arises whether “Carcieri” 
lands should be viewed as “restricted Indian lands.” 
Actually, federal legislation provides a strong argument that “Car-
cieri” lands are “restricted Indian lands.”  The basis for this conclusion 
is found in the text of the modern version of the Indian Non-
Intercourse Act.164  The text of the current statute clearly states that 
 
public/documents/text/idc-002458.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).  
 160. See id. 
 161. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a) (2009), which provides: 
  The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action 
under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the 
United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water 
rights. This section does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands . . . . 
 162. Id. 
 163. Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1068 (2009). 
 164. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2009).  Section 177 provides: 
  No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title 
or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any 
validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention 
entered into pursuant to the Constitution. Every person who, not being 
employed under the authority of the United States, attempts to negotiate 
such treaty or convention, directly or indirectly, or to treat with any such 
nation or tribe of Indians for the title or purchase of any lands by them held 
or claimed, is liable to a penalty of $1,000. The agent of any State who may 
be present at any treaty held with Indians under the authority of the United 
States, in the presence and with the approbation of the commissioner of the 
United States appointed to hold the same, may, however, propose to, and 
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no conveyance of lands owned by a tribe is valid unless entered into 
pursuant to a treaty.165  This language appears to restrict the transfer 
of lands owned by any federally recognized Indian tribe whether the 
lands are located on or off the reservation.  Whether tribally owned 
lands located off a tribe’s reservation are “restricted” within the 
meaning of the modern Indian Non-Intercourse Act is entirely 
unclear.166  The status of these fee lands owned by tribes and located 
outside reservations remains unclear with the result that actions to 
quiet title to “Carcieri” lands may require one or more trips to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
In summary, then, continuing ownership of the land by the Unit-
ed States, even after the decision in the Carcieri case, provides 
immunity from state and local property taxation because these lands 
are owned by the federal government.  If the particular tribe is the 
outright owner of the lands, then state and local property taxation is 
probably permitted because the lands are located outside the 
reservation.  If ownership of the lands is unclear, then any party other 
than the United States or the particular tribe may be barred from 
determining title through a quiet-title action because the restrictions 
in the federal statute allowing quiet-title actions when the United 
States has an interest does not waive federal sovereign immunity if the 
 
adjust with, the Indians the compensation to be made for their claim to 
lands within such State, which shall be extinguished by treaty. 
Congress enacted the original version of the Indian Non-Intercourse Act in 1790.  
The relevant provision of the 1790 statute states: 
And be it enacted and declared, That no sale of lands made by any Indians, 
or any nation or tribe of Indians within the United States, shall be valid to 
any person or persons or to any state, whether having the right of pre-
emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be made and duly 
executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United 
States. 
Act of July 22, 1790, ch. XXXIII, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138. 
 165. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2009). 
 166. Compare Alonzo v. United States, 249 F.2d 189, 195 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. 
denied, 355 U.S. 940 (1958) (finding that lands purchased by and owned in fee simple 
by the Pueblo of Laguna, a federally recognized Indian tribe, were restricted lands for 
purposes of 25 U.S.C. § 177), with Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank, 112 F.3d 538, 
550 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 913 (1997) (finding that fee lands outside the 
reservation and purchased by the tribe were not “tribal trust property” within the 
meaning of 25 U.S.C. § 81, which requires BIA approval of contracts with tribes 
involving “tribal trust property”).  See City of Sherill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 
197 (2005) (allowing state taxation of fee lands purchased by the Oneida Indian 
Nation and not placed in trust under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act 
under special circumstances where the formal reservation boundaries from 1795 had 
not been confirmed and the land claims of the tribe were subject to ongoing 
negotiations). 
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lands involved may be restricted Indian lands.167 
State income taxation of a tribe is another matter.  As a general 
rule, a tribe is immune from state income taxation for activities that it 
undertakes within its reservation or within lands deemed to be Indian 
Country of the tribe under 28 U.S.C. § 1151.168  In the Carcieri case, 
the Tribe’s housing authority undertook its housing development on 
the lands in question.169  It appears that the housing authority was a 
unit of the tribal government.170  Arguably, the income earned by the 
tribal housing authority is income that is subject to the Rhode Island 
income tax.171  Whether the housing authority is one of these business 
entities is unclear.  If the Narragansett Tribe had incorporated its 
housing authority under section 19 of the Indian Reorganization 
Act,172 then Rhode Island would be in a good position to argue that 
the housing authority is a corporation that, once it starts collecting 
rents from its tenants, has income subject to Rhode Island’s corporate 
income tax.173  Under the authority of the Mescalero case, states will 
likely assert the power to tax incomes earned by tribes or their legal 
entities on activities taking place outside of the tribes’ reservation or 
outside their Indian Country. 
The imposition of other state taxes on a federally recognized 
Indian tribe usually requires an inquiry into the legal incidence of a 
particular tax.  If the legal incidence of a state tax falls on the tribe 
and if the activity takes place within the tribe’s reservation or Indian 
Country, then the state tax is preempted as a matter of federal Indian 
 
 167. See Scott A. Taylor, The Native American Law Opinions of Judge Noonan: Do We 
Hear the Faint Voice of Bartolome de las Casas?, 1 ST. THOMAS L.J. 148, 167–69 (2003). 
 168. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995). 
 169. See supra Part I. 
 170. See Housing Department, Narragansett Indian Tribe’s Website, 
http://www.narragansett-tribe.org/housing-dept.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009) 
(describing its housing projects, including the project for twelve one-bedroom units 
on the land in question subject to an agreement with the Town of Charlestown). 
 171. The Rhode Island income tax applies to individuals, corporations, and other 
business entities.  See R.I. Stat. § 44-11-2 (2009) (corporate income tax); § 44-30-1 
(2009) (income tax imposed on individuals, estate, and trusts). 
 172. See 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2009) (allowing the formation of federally chartered 
corporations that are wholly owned by the particular tribe that seeks the charter). See 
also Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19 (ruling that a section 17 corporation owned by a 
federally recognized Indian tribe is exempt from the federal income tax for income 
earned on or off the reservation but not providing any authority concerning state 
income taxation). 
 173. See R.I. Stat. § 44-11-2(a) (2009) (imposing a 9% tax on the net income of 
corporations); § 44-11-1(2) (defining a corporation as “every corporation,” which 
presumably includes a corporation incorporated under section 17 of the Indian 
Reorganization Act and owned by an Indian tribe). 
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law unless a federal statute authorizes the imposition of the state 
tax.174  Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation is the leading case 
on legal incidence.  Determining legal incidence is not such an easy 
task, but in general, legal incidence falls on the person designated in 
the statute as the taxpayer responsible for collecting and paying the 
tax.175  Because legal incidence is coupled with the location of the 
activity, a tribe’s immunity from a state tax does not extend to off-
reservation activities.176  The facts in the Chickasaw case illustrate this 
principle quite well.  The Chickasaw Nation owned and operated a gas 
station on tribal lands (within the Nation’s Indian Country).177  
Oklahoma imposed a gasoline excise tax on the retail sellers of 
gasoline.  Accordingly, the legal incidence of the fuel excise tax fell 
on the Chickasaw Nation.178  Because of the legal incidence of the tax 
and the location of the activity, the state excise tax was preempted 
and, therefore, invalid.179  If the Chickasaw Nation had been a tribe 
recognized after 1934, and if it had located its gas station on “Carcieri” 
lands, then the location of the gas station would have been outside 
the reservation and outside Indian Country.  In that case, then, 
Oklahoma’s gasoline excise tax would have been valid. 
After the Carcieri case, state income taxation of members also 
becomes a critical issue.  The residence of tribal members has a 
critical impact on whether a state can impose its income tax on 
them.180  If a tribal member lives and works on the tribe’s reservation 
or on off-reservation trust lands of the tribe, then a state cannot 
impose its income tax on that person.181  However, if the person lives 
outside the reservation or not on trust lands, even though he or she 
may work on the reservation or have income derived from the tribe, a 
state is free to impose its income tax on a tribal member.182 
The Cacieri case is a good illustration of this principle allowing 
state income taxation of tribal members who do not live within Indian 
Country.  Let us suppose that ten elderly tribal members live on the 
Narragansett Indian Tribe’s housing development located on the 
 
 174. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458–59 
(1995). 
 175. Id. at 459. 
 176. See id. at 462–67. 
 177. See id. at 452–53. 
 178. See id. at 461. 
 179. Id. at 454. 
 180. See id. at 464. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. 
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thirty-one-acre tract of land that the U.S. Supreme Court found could 
not be held in trust under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act.  
Let us further assume that these ten tribal members receive modest 
distributions from the Tribe and that these distributions constitute 
income for federal income tax purposes.  These ten tribal members, 
because they are living on lands outside the reservation of their tribe 
and outside what the Supreme Court has defined as the Tribe’s 
Indian Country, must pay Rhode Island’s income tax.  If the tribal 
payments are relatively small, then the Rhode Island income tax on 
each of these tribal members may be zero or a small amount because 
the Rhode Island income tax is twenty-five percent of the federal 
income tax.183  So, for example, if the federal income tax were $1000, 
then the Rhode Island income tax would be twenty-five percent of this 
amount, or $250.  If, however, the payments by the Tribe were 
substantial, and if the resulting federal income tax were $10,000 for a 
particular member, then the Rhode Island income tax for this tribal 
member would be $2500.  Whether state income taxation of these 
tribal members is justified when they have changed their residence by 
just moving across the road is questionable, especially if the tribe is 
providing all or most of the social services they need. 
Housing for tribal members, especially for those tribes with a 
small land base, is a legitimate reason for expanding a tribe’s land 
base.  If the tribe in question is one that was recognized after 
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act, then putting land into 
trust for such a tribe wanting to provide housing for members is not 
an attractive option if exposure to state income taxation would be 
costly for individual members.  For those gaming tribes that make 
substantial per capita payments to members, exposure to state income 
taxation now arises if they find themselves living on “Carcieri” lands.  
The income tax liability could be sizable because most of these 
individuals have not filed state income tax returns.  Without having 
filed a return, these individuals are not protected by the statute of 
limitations.  In most states, the statute of limitations against assess-
ment of income taxes is a relatively long period if a return is not 
filed.184  Interest on the unpaid income taxes will certainly increase 
the size of the liability. 
 
 183. See R.I. STAT. § 44-30-2-1(1)(xii) (2009). 
 184. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. 7-1-18(C) (2009) (providing a seven-year statute of 
limitations if the taxpayer does not file an income tax return), with I.R.C. § 
6501(c)(3) (2009) (providing an unlimited period if the taxpayer does not file a 
federal income tax return). 
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss2/10
7. Taylor.docx 1/18/2010  9:39 PM 
618 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:2 
C. Federal Taxation 
Federal income taxation in Indian Country remains largely un-
changed after the Carcieri case.  In general, federally recognized 
Indian tribes, their units of government, and their wholly owned 
corporations formed under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization 
Act are exempt from the federal income tax.185  This exemption from 
income taxation applies whether the activities take place on or off the 
reservation of a tribe or within or outside its Indian Country.186  
Federal income taxation of tribal members is generally broad with a 
narrow exemption for income derived directly from tribal lands.187  
The exemption applies to timber, crops, cattle, oil and gas, and 
extraction of minerals.188  Another exemption from the federal 
income tax applies for income derived from the exercise of treaty 
fishing rights.189 
Tribal exemption from certain federal excise taxes depends on 
the underlying purpose of the activity.  For example, exemption from 
the federal fuel excise tax requires that the use of the fuel be 
restricted to furtherance of an essential governmental function of the 
tribe.190  Federal payroll taxes apply to tribes as employers, and the 
status of the lands where tribal employees work is irrelevant.191  As a 
result, the Carcieri case does not change the imposition of these taxes. 
Tribal bonds, however, are potentially affected.  Tribes have the 
authority to issue three types of bonds.  The first type is an “essential 
governmental function” bond where the proceeds are used to fund 
construction of roads, sewers, water systems, schools, health care 
facilities, and government buildings.192  The statute authorizing the 
issuance of these bonds does not require that the proceeds be spent 
on projects within the reservation.  The housing project undertaken 
by the Narragansett Indian Tribe in Carcieri probably would qualify for 
tax-exempt tribal bond financing because providing housing for the 
 
 185. See Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956) (extending a federal income tax 
exemption to the proceeds derived from cutting timber on allotted land held in trust 
for an individual Indian); see also Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55 (discussing the 
requirement that the income must be derived directly from the land). 
 188. See Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55. 
 189. See I.R.C. § 7873. 
 190. See id. § 7871(b). 
 191. See In re Cabazon Indian Casino, 57 B.R. 398, 403 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) 
(upholding the imposition of both FICA and FUTA taxes). 
 192. See I.R.C. § 7871(a)(4), (c)(1). 
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elderly would be viewed as an essential governmental function of the 
kind undertaken by state and local governments.193 
The second type of tribal bond allows funding of manufacturing 
facilities owned by the tribe194 and located on lands held in trust for 
the tribe by the United States.195  It is possible that some tribes may 
have issued these bonds to fund manufacturing facilities located on 
“Carcieri” lands.  If so, the bonds are no longer tax-exempt after the 
Carcieri case because the Secretary of Interior, according to the 
Supreme Court, lacked the authority to place the lands in trust under 
section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act.  The owners of these 
bonds are probably not in a position to know whether these bonds 
have lost their exempt status.  The Bureau of Indian Affairs does not 
provide a list of “Carcieri” lands and may be unable to ever provide a 
complete list. 
The third type of bond is relatively new.196  Congress allowed the 
issuance of “tribal economic development bonds” in February 2009.197  
The proceeds from these bonds cannot be used to fund facilities 
located outside a tribe’s reservation.198  As a result, the Carcieri case 
also has a negative impact on these bonds.  Because the statute came 
into effect in February 2009, and because the Supreme Court issued 
its opinion in the Carcieri case on February 24, 2009, it is very likely 
that no tribal economic development bonds have or will be issued to 
fund the construction of facilities located on “Carcieri” lands. 
Finally, two federal tax incentives are adversely affected by the 
Carcieri decision.  The first is the Indian employment income tax 
credit.199  This credit allows an employer to claim a substantial credit 
for employing Native Americans within Indian Country.  The statute 
requires that substantially all of the work be performed on the 
reservation.200  As a result, “Carcieri” lands would not qualify as a place 
of employment for purposes of this credit.  This tax credit expires at 
the end of 2009.201  The other tax incentive is rapid depreciation for 
facilities built on Indian reservations.202  The definitions for an Indian 
 
 193. See id. § 7871(e). 
 194. See id. § 7871(c)(3). 
 195. See id. § 7871(c)(3)(B)(iii)(I), (c)(3)(E)(i). 
 196. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. 
B, tit. I, subtit. E, § 1402(a), 123 Stat. 351 (2009). 
 197. See I.R.C. § 7871(f). 
 198. See id. § 7871(f)(3)(B)(ii). 
 199. See id. § 45A. 
 200. See id. § 45A(c)(1)(B). 
 201. See id. § 45A(f). 
 202. See id. § 168(j). 
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reservation exclude “Carcieri” lands.203  And like the Indian employ-
ment credit, the provision expires at the end of 2009.204 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Carcieri case is troubling for two important reasons.  First, it 
ruptures the goals of the Indian Reorganization Act which Congress 
intended as a way to reconstitute Indian tribes, to provide a basis for 
self-government, and to help them expand their land base.  Second, 
the Carcieri case, because it involves so many tribes and so many 
transfers of land, will generate enormous amounts of litigation over 
regulation and taxation.  Most tribes and states would rather go about 
the business of promoting economic development on and around 
Indian reservations so that tribal members and those non-members 
who work for tribal enterprises can go about the business of raising 
their families and attending to their children’s education, health, and 
general well being.  Consequently, a statutory solution may be the best 
course of action to correct the Court’s erroneous decision in Carcieri.  
On September 24, 2009, North Dakota Senator Bryan Dorgan 
introduced such a bill in the United States Senate.  This bill, if passed, 
would amend the Indian Reorganization Act to make clear that the 
Secretary of Interior does have the authority to place lands in trust for 
any and all federally recognized Indian tribes without regard to the 
date of their recognition.205  Prospects for passage are uncertain given 
concerns over the bill’s possible effect on the expansion of Indian 
gaming. 
 
 203. See I.R.C. § 168(j)(6). 
 204. See id. § 168(j)(8). 
 205. See S. 1703, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s111-1703. 
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